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Abstract Using a comprehensive dataset on micro,
small, and medium enterprises in India, we examine
whether the gender of the owner matters in firm perfor-
mance and in credit access from institutional sources.
The study finds significant underperformance in the
size, growth, and efficiency of firms owned by women
when compared to those owned by men. In line with the
evidence in the existing literature, our findings also
support the view that women-owned firms are disad-
vantaged in the market for small-business credit. These
findings suggest that addressing gender discrimination
in the small-business credit market could help, partly, in
bridging the performance gap between male- and
female-owned firms.
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1 Introduction
It is well recognized that small firms are the engine of
innovation and economic growth (Acs and Armington
2006; Baumol 2002). The OECD (2016) reports that in
emerging economies, small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) account for up to 45% of total employment
and 33% of GDP. According to a recent study from
the International Finance Corporation (IFC 2012),
SMEs account for more than half of all formal jobs
worldwide, and their share of aggregate employment is
comparable to that of large firms. The re-evaluation
of the role of small firms is related to a renewed
attention to the role of entrepreneurship as it can
create new economic opportunities for women and
contribute to overall inclusive growth. Amorós and
Bosma (2013) observes that the share of entrepre-
neurs remains relatively stagnant over the years
and female entrepreneurs face gender biases due
to various socio-economic factors.1
A related question of great policy importance on
gender, entrepreneurship, and firm performance is there-
fore to analyze the performance of female-owned firms
compared to the ones owned by males and examine the
differences in their observed performance. Using firm-
level data from OECD countries, Watson (2002) and
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1 The total early-stage entrepreneurial activity (defined as percentage
of either nascent entrepreneurs or owner-managers of new businesses
in the 18–64 age group of population) in India has remained stagnant:
10.09% in 2006 and 9.88% in 2013, whereas the ratio of female to male
in the same category has declined from 0.79 in 2006 to 0.49 in 2013
(source: http://gemconsortium.org/data/key-aps).
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Fairlie and Robb (2009) demonstrate that performance
of female-owned businesses on key parameters, such as
profit, size, and productivity is lower than that of male-
owned businesses. But the findings differ across coun-
tries, types of firms and the control that has been used,
and are also subject to criticism due to the small sample
size. Sabarwal and Terell (2008), using data from East-
ern Europe and Central Asia, document that female-
owned enterprises are smaller in both size of assets
and employment. These findings have been echoed by
Coleman (2007) in the case of 1998 US Survey of Small
Business Finances. Using World Bank Enterprise Sur-
vey data, Bardasi et al. (2011) show the absence of a
gender differential in value added per worker and total
factor productivity while controlling for the industry in
which they work. However, Bardasi et al. (2011) show
that female-owned firms are less efficient in both East-
ern Europe & Central Asia and Latin America but not in
sub-Saharan Africa. Using the World Bank Enterprise
Survey data for the sub-Saharan African region, Aterido
et al. (2011) indicate a significant gender gap in the labor
coefficient and a 12% productivity gap between male-
and female-owned firms.
Various factors have been put forward in the literature
to explain the underperformance of female entrepre-
neurs: disproportionate concentration in more competi-
tive industries or in industries with lower productivity,
asymmetric access to capital and discriminatory access
to finance. Coleman (2007) shows that women are con-
centrated in more competitive sectors such as retail and
service sectors, thus getting less opportunities for
growth and performance.Watson (2002) documents that
poor performance of female-owned enterprises in Aus-
tralia is due to lower initial start-up capital.
Although access to formal finance is often highlight-
ed as the most pressing obstacle to the growth of small
and medium enterprises (SMEs), existing literature
highlights women-owned enterprises particularly suffer
from difficulty in obtaining credit from formal sources
(Berger and Udell 2006).2 Previous literature also high-
lights that women-owned firms have lower loan approv-
al rates from formal sources indicating credit market
discrimination (Muravyev et al. (2009). Using cross-
country data from the Business Environment and Enter-
prise Performance Survey (BEEPS), Muravyev et al.
(2009) observe that females face a lower probability of
receiving loans and have to pay higher interest rates. As
a result, women are dissuaded from entrepreneurship
and running business on an efficient scale. While
using the survey data for three Caribbean countries,
Presbitero et al. (2014) report that women-owned busi-
nesses are more likely to be financially constrained.
Their estimates indicate that firms with a predominant
presence of female owners are 2.1 percentage points
more likely to be credit rationed by the banking system
than other firms. However, Bardasi et al. (2011) do not
find evidence of gender-based discrimination in access
to formal finance. The absence of gender-based discrim-
ination is also endorsed by Aterido et al. (2013) and
Storey (2004). Unlike most of the earlier studies, Hewa
Wellalage and Locke (2017) report that women-owned
enterprises face lower credit constraints in South Asia.
Apart from credit market discrimination, women-owned
businesses also face difficulties in the form of cultural
barriers, concentration of business in low-productivity
sectors and small size of the business, and these barriers
widen the performance gap between male-run and
female-run enterprises (Klapper and Parker 2011). Fur-
ther, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) show that normative
and regulatory institutions create gender differences in
entrepreneurship.
Even though both male-owned and female-owned
businesses face barriers in access to formal financial
services, the obstacles are bigger for women-led busi-
nesses. The reasons for the observed gender gap in
access to financial services may stem from both the
supply and demand sides of the credit market. In a
pioneering work, Becker (1957) emphasized taste-
based discrimination arising from cultural and institu-
tional factors. Various studies have extended this argu-
ment to bank-level discrimination against loan applica-
tions from women-led businesses. Further, lenders
might engage in statistical discrimination (Arrow
1973) by using personal characteristics like gender and
believe that women are more likely to default. The
demand-side factor stresses the lower number of credit
applications from women-led businesses due to the fear
of refusal. Lower demand for credit by women-owned
firms rise due to certain characteristics such as small size
of business, Brisk aversion,^ Bperceiving themselves to
be less creditworthy^ (Watson and Robinson 2003),
Bperceiving financial barriers that do not exist,^ Black
of self-confidence^ (Scott and Roper 2009), and sector
of activity.
2 Numerous studies have shown the association of availability of capital
in promoting the growth of small firms (Banerjee and Duflo 2010; De
Mel et al. 2009).
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Although there exists some work on OECD coun-
tries, research using data on small firms in developing
countries including India is growing. For example, Coad
and Tamvada (2012), using firm-level data from the
third census of registered small-scale firms, showed that
firms headed by females grow slower after controlling
for other factors. De and Nagaraj (2014) have also used
data from Indian manufacturing firms to show that firms
with better liquidity turn out to be the most productive.
Deshpande and Sharma (2013) highlighted the ethical
and racial disparity in indicators of business perfor-
mance. In a study of micro women entrepreneurs in
the city of Ahmadabad (located in the state of Gujarat)
in India, Kantor (2005) reports no influence of access to
credit on the value added.
Our study contributes to the growing body of litera-
ture on ownership and firm performance and access to
finance in the following ways. First, most of the studies
were confined to the experience of developed countries
and therefore, these findings cannot be easily general-
ized to the context of developing economies. Second, in
this study, we use a unique large data set of Indian
micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to an-
alyze the gender differences in obtaining formal finance.
India presents an ideal case for two reasons: (a) the
MSME sector accounts for more than 95% of the indus-
trial units and contributes 45% of the manufacturing
output and 40% of the exports (Ministry of MSME
2014). In terms of employment, the 31.1 million enter-
prises in the sector employ 73.2 million workers
(Ministry of MSME 2011). Therefore, small enterprises
play a vital role in generating employment and promot-
ing industrialization in the Indian economy, and (b)
post-independence, the policymakers in India empha-
sized the need to promote MSMEs and gave them
favorable treatment by offering credit and tax conces-
sions and reserving certain products only for the sector
(Tendulkar and Bhavani 1997). With the onset of eco-
nomic reforms, new policy initiatives led to de-
reservation of various items reserved for MSMEs and
preference for such firms in government purchase pro-
curements. Despite the preferential treatment of MSME
sector in India, such firms are plagued by several obsta-
cles. Among the set of constraints faced by these firms,
access to finance is reported to be the most pressing
obstacle (Sharma 2014). In this context, policymakers
have realized the need to provide a helping hand to this
sector and have undertaken a host of initiatives such as
credit guarantee schemes, promotion of women
entrepreneurship, and marketing assistance for acceler-
ating the growth of this sector. Third, our dataset is rich
in terms of detailed information about the presence of
women in ownership and management of enterprises.
Finally, a recent study noted that empirical studies on
gender gap in access to finance will provide better
insight into credit market functioning, if the details of
different measures of female participation in the firms
are taken into account (Presbitero et al. 2014). Since our
dataset contains information about different measures of
female participation regarding ownership and manage-
ment of the firms and credit access, we are able to
investigate the presence of a gender gap in access to
financial instruments along with a decomposition anal-
ysis applicable to non-linear models.
The results indicate the underperformance in size and
efficiency of firms owned by women when compared to
those owned by men. We find that women-led enter-
prises are overwhelmingly represented in few (three)
sectors. Further, we observe that women entrepreneurs
fare worse than their male counterparts in the female
dominant sectors in terms of performance. Our empiri-
cal analysis suggests that irrespective of the extent of
women’s involvement in the firms, women-owned firms
are more likely to be denied credit than male-owned
firms. The findings are thus consistent with the fact that
women-owned firms face a disadvantage in the market
for small-business credit, which has been traditionally
attributed to discrimination. Results from the decompo-
sition analysis show that the probability of not getting a
loan varies between 2 and 4% depending on the role
played by the female as owner, manager, or as both and
the difference is mainly due to the endowment effect
rather than the characteristics effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Details
of the data source are provided in Section 2 along with
the methodology. Discussion of the results obtained
from the empirical exercise is reported in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes the study.
2 Data source and methodology
2.1 Data source
Unlike most of the previous work relying on surveys of
a small sample of firms, our study is based on Census
data provided by the Ministry of Small Scale Industries,
Government of India. We employ unit-level data drawn
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from the Fourth round of the Indian Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises (MSME) Survey for the year
2006–2007.3 This rich dataset contains information
pertaining to 2.24 million small firms belonging to the
registered and unregistered sectors. The Ministry of
Small Scale Industries defines enterprises with invest-
ment of up to INR 2.5 million in plant and machinery as
micro enterprises, enterprises with investment between
INR 2.5 million and INR 50 million as small firms, and
enterprises with investment between INR 50million and
INR 100 million as medium enterprises. The dataset
contains firms belonging to manufacturing, services
and repairing and maintenance sectors. In this study,
we confine the analysis to the sample of firms belonging
to the manufacturing sector. The database provides in-
formation related to the gender of the owner, firm’s year
of initial production, the sector of its operation, the gross
output for three consecutive financial years, ownership
type, export, loan status, quality certification, and net
worth as well as information on reporting status on
financial accounts by the firm.
Like any typical enterprise-level data from develop-
ing countries, our dataset also contains missing values
and outlier observations that are likely to bias our esti-
mates. Therefore, we clean the original dataset to take
care of the missing observations and outliers. We follow
certain procedures while undertaking the data cleaning
process: First, we omit those firms which did not re-
spond to one ormore key questions. Second, we exclude
those firms with seemingly unrealistic information such
as missing, zero or negative output, missing labor, and
capital stock values. These elimination norms reduced
the number of firms in the dataset to 1,157,877 from
1,313,210 (about 12% of the firms in our dataset we
have filtered out). We use suitable deflators (wholesale
price indices) to make price corrections to the reported
data on output, intermediate inputs, and value-added
and fixed assets. Data related to wholesale price indices
have been obtained from the report on Index Number of
Wholesale Prices in India, published by the Office of the
Economic Advisor, Ministry of Industry, Government
of India.
Table 1 compares the mean values of our main var-
iables of interest, by gender of the owner. It is clearly
evident from the table that there exist considerable dif-
ferences in firm characteristics between male-owned
and female-owned firms. Compared to the male-
owned firms, the average production is considerably
lower in female-owned firms. The average log of output
for male-owned firms is 12.63 and female-owned firms
is 11.25. The female-owned firms are younger and
smaller in size and mostly located in urban areas as
compared to male-owned firms. As regards loan avail-
ability, male business owners are more likely to obtain
credit (12%) than women (8%). Looking at the firms’
presence in the export market, male business owners are
much more likely to enter export markets than
women-run businesses. Thus, in terms of raw av-
erages, female-owned firms clearly perform much
worse than male-owned firms.4
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Difference in the performance of male-
and female-owned firms
We employ a number of indicators to capture the gaps in
performance between male-owned and female-owned
firms. These indicators include output and employment
(proxies for firm size) and efficiency as captured by
labor productivity (output per worker) and total factor
productivity.We obtain TFP estimates by fitting a Cobb-
Douglas production function to firm-level data where
real output is regressed on real gross fixed assets and
number of workers. We control for industry and state
fixed effects.5 To measure the performance gap, we
regress each of the indicators of performance/
efficiency on three different dummies: dummy for fe-
male owner, dummy for female manager, and, finally, a
dummy for female in dual role as owner and manager
(Female).
3 Coad and Tamvada (2012) have used the third round of the data.
4 We follow the MSME Survey and define those entities in which one
or more women entrepreneurs in proprietary concerns, or in which she/
they individually or jointly have a share capital of not less than 51% as
partners/shareholders/directors of private limited company/members of
cooperative society as a Bwoman enterprise.^ It takes a value of 0 for
male-owned and 1 for female-owned enterprises. Our second measure
identifies women-managed enterprises and takes the value one when
the person managing the affairs of the unit is a woman. Further, in our
third measure, we identify enterprises in which the owner as well as the
person managing the affairs of the units is a woman. The variable takes
the value 1 if a woman performs the dual responsibilities as owner and
manager. In our dataset, 13.5% of the firms are female owned, 11% are
female managed and 9.7% are female owned and managed. We have
conducted a two-sample test of proportions where the null hypothesis
is that the proportion is equal. In every case, we have rejected the null.
5 We transform all the variables (output, capital, and labor) to their
natural logarithmic values while calculating TFP.
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We further examine whether there is a preponderance
of women enterprises in less productive and labor-
intensive sectors by computing an index that captures
their representation in each sector following Bardasi
et al. (2011). We define this index as follows:
FR ¼ FSFT
where FS is the share of female entrepreneurs to total
entrepreneurs in a particular sector and FT is the share of
female entrepreneurs to total entrepreneurs in the entire
MSME sector. If the value of FRis greater than one for a
particular sector, it implies that the female entrepreneurs
are overrepresented in that sector in comparison with
their representation as a whole.
To examine whether the observed underperformance
of women-owned enterprises is due to the overrepresen-
tation of women in less productive sectors, we compare
the relative performance of female-owned firms in
female-dominated industries with those industries
where they are not overrepresented. One drawback of
such a comparison is the possibility of endogeneity. It is
possible that the lower performance of female-owned
enterprises may be explaining the lower performance of
sectors where they are overcrowded. To circumvent this,
we first group the industrial sectors into two categories:
one category for female-dominated industrial sectors
(sectors with FR > 1) and another for male-dominated
sectors (sectors with FR < 1). In the next step, we em-
ploy the following specification to examine the relative
performance of male- and female-owned firms:
lnY jis ¼ β þ πFemalejis
þ αFemale Dominant Sectorjis
þ θFemalejis
 Female Dominant Sectorjis þ δX jis þ γi
þ δs þ εjis ð1Þ
where Yjis stands for performance/productivity of firm j
operating in industry i and in state s. Female is the
dummy for female entrepreneur which takes the value
1 for female entrepreneur and 0 for male entrepreneur.
The estimated π coefficient of Female indicates the
overall performance of female firms in our dataset.
Female Dominant Sector is the dummy variable for
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Male owned Female owned p value
Mean SD Mean SD
Log of current real output 12.633 1.722 11.250 1.306 0.000
Log of employment 1.091 0.920 0.514 0.701 0.000
Age 13.156 9.030 8.772 6.364 0.000
Loan dummy (yes = 1) 0.118 – 0.078 – 0.000
Institutional loan dummy (yes = 1) 0.099 – 0.070 – 0.000
Account maintenance dummy (yes =1) 0.332 – 0.148 – 0.000
Location (rural/urban) 0.545 – 0.422 – 0.000
Unit a part of cluster dummy 0.080 – 0.038 – 0.000
Has a quality certificate dummy 0.040 – 0.025 – 0.000
Export dummy 0.034 – 0.012 – 0.000
Knowledge of technology dummy 0.121 – 0.108 – 0.000
Log of net worth 12.142 1.808 10.866 1.514 0.000
Log of real value of plant and machinery 11.048 2.056 9.923 1.823 0.000
Single ownership dummy 0.905 – 0.963 – 0.000
Owner of the enterprise 0.865 – 0.135 – 0.000
Manager of the enterprise 0.890 – 0.110 – 0.000
Both owner and manager 0.903 – 0.097 – 0.000
p value is for two-sample t test with unequal variances. For binary variable, we do not report the standard deviation (SD)
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female-dominated sectors and its coefficient, α, enables
us to capture the differences in performance between
firms in female-dominated and male-dominated sectors.
The estimated θ coefficient of the interaction term Fe-
male × Female Dominant Sector yields the additional
effect associatedwith female-owned firms operating in a
female-dominated sector. γi and δs are industry and state
fixed effects respectively. Equation (1) differentiates
between two implicit hypotheses of lower perfor-
mance of the two categories of industries (female-
dominated and male-dominated sectors) and lower
performance of women entrepreneurs within these
industries.
2.2.2 Gender gap in access to finance
To analyze the gender gap in accessing finance, we
estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is
loan status, i.e., whether the firm has access to external
finance (loan). Female is a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 for female entrepreneurship and zero other-
wise. We also include a set of firm-specific control
variables along with industry and state dummies. The
estimated equation is:
Y jis ¼ β þ πFemalejis þ δX jis þ γi þ δs þ εjis ð2Þ
where Yjis is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the firm j operating in industry i and in state s obtained
external finance (loan) and 0 otherwise. We use three
alternate measures of female entrepreneurship as before:
dummy for female owner, dummy for female manager,
and a dummy for female in dual role as owner and
manager. X is a vector of firm-specific attributes that
could influence the probability of obtaining loan. These
firm-specific characteristics are also important from the
lender’s point of view as they reflect the creditworthi-
ness and resources of a firm that the lender might
consider while making a decision to grant a loan. To
be specific, we include three alternative measures of
firm performance or how well the firm is run (measured
either by performance variables such as profit, or labor
productivity or net worth of the firms), productivity (real
value of current and lagged output), size (real value of
plant and machinery), a measure of export opportunities
(a dummy indicating whether or not a firm exports), the
financial literacy and ability of the entrepreneur (wheth-
er or not the firm is maintaining an account and whether
the firm has a quality certificate), a measure of
ownership (whether the firm has a single owner or
multiple owners), a measure to capture the possible
effects of participating in networks (whether the firm is
part of a cluster), the role of age (defined as the number
of years since the firm began its operation) and its
squared term and the size of the firm (measured by
two proxies: employment and the amount of sales
2 years before the current period). To control for the
environments in which firms operate, we include dum-
my for location, which takes the value 1 if the firms are
operating in rural areas and 0 if they operate from urban
areas. γi is the industry fixed effects and δs denotes state
fixed effects.
To disentangle the role of various factors in deter-
mining gender gap in access to finance, we also employ
a decomposition technique to understand the extent to
which our results are influenced by observable and
unobservable components. This would allow us to ex-
plain the gap in the access to credit between the two
groups of firms. The gap is decomposed into that part
which is due to the group differences in predictors, i.e.,
the part of the gap due to the differences in the average
characteristics based on the gender of the owner (the
Bendowment effects^) and group differences in the co-
efficients, where the latter is sometimes called the unex-
plained part of the gender gap. We adopted Oaxaca
(1973) decomposition technique modified for non-
linear model following Powers et al. (2011), Jann
(2008), and Fairlie (2006).
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Gender of the owner and performance
In this section, we discuss the results regarding firms’
performance/productivity with respect to the gender of
the owner/manager. Table 2 presents the baseline re-
sults. For each performance/productivity measure, we
estimate three specifications based on the extent and
involvement of women in the ownership and manage-
ment of firms, i.e., women as owner (column 2), women
as manager (column 3), and women as owner and man-
ager (column 4). In all the specifications, we control for
age and its square as well as the size of the firms along
with 2-digit SIC industry dummies and state dummies to
account for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry
and state levels. We include age and its square term as
control variables as the differences in the age of the
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firms owned by males and females could explain the
observed gaps in the performance of male and female
entrepreneurs. Women have been increasingly engaging
in entrepreneurial activities recently; hence, their ven-
tures will be much younger than the ones operated by
their male counterparts. Their lower experience in man-
aging entrepreneurial concerns might well explain their
underperformance as entrepreneurs.6 Female-owned
firms in our dataset are indeed much younger than the
male-owned firms and the firms operated by male en-
trepreneurs are on average 4 years older than the female-
owned firms.7
Women entrepreneurship is largely skewed towards
smaller-sized firms, and this gap in firm size, at least
partially, could explain the existence of a gender gap in
firms’ performance (Marlow and McAdam 2013).8 It is
argued that majority of women entrepreneurs are often in
business because running a small enterprise allows them
to bring in additional income with little additional effort
6 It needs to be stated that the relatively lower age of firms owned by
females may be a result of underperformance of women entrepreneurs,
as we observed in this study. If the survival rate of women owned firms
are lower than that of male owned firms, it is possible that the female
owned firms are on average younger than male-owned firms. Our data
does not permit us to examine this hypothesis; however, it is safer to
assume that younger firms are on average less experienced than older
firms (Bardasi et al. 2011).
Table 2 Gender and firms’ performance
Variable Women as owner Women as manager Women as owner and manager
Size of the firm
Natural log of output
Female − 0.323*** (0.100) − 0.519*** (0.061) − 0.567*** (0.049)
R-squared 0.511 0.515 0.515
Employment
Female − 0.138** (0.070) − 0.243*** (0.054) − 0.271*** (0.047)
R-squared 0.414 0.417 0.418
No. of observations 1,155,877 1,155,877 1,155,877
Growth in output
Female − 4.504 (8.452) − 0.777 (7.217) − 5.680 (6.425)
R-squared 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 1,155,877 1,155,877 1,155,877
Efficiency
Labor productivity
Female − 0.186*** (0.031) − 0.277*** (0.025) − 0.296*** (0.031)
R-squared 0.354 0.356 0.356
Total factor productivity
Female − 0.246** (0.092) − 0.406*** (0.062) − 0.450*** (0.049)
R-squared 0.598 0.601 0.602
No. of observations 1,155,877 1,155,877 1,155,877
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes
Female stands for dummy for female as owner, female as manager, and female as both owner and manager. In all specifications, we use age
and its square, firm size (using three dummy variables for micro, small and medium firms), caste of the owner (using three dummy variables
for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and other backward caste (general as the base category)), dummies controlling for type of organization,
industry dummy at two-digit SIC level, and state effects. Figures in parentheses are standard errors, corrected for clustering at the industry level
***indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
7 A t test signifies that the difference in age is indeed significant.
8 In India, almost 98% of women-owned firms are micro-enterprises,
and approximately 90% of women-owned enterprises are in the infor-
mal sector (IFC 2012).
Kausik Chaudhuri: Gender, small firm ownership, and credit access: some insights from India
and they are unlikely to expand or invest in their busi-
nesses. Previous research highlights that intention and
motivation of women entrepreneurs are different from
male-led businesses. Women-led businesses may be less
interested in growth objectives but may be more motived
by the flexibility and the personal fulfillment it offers
(Klapper and Parker 2011; Morris et al. 2006). Some
studies also show that women tend to display greater risk
aversion, which leads them to restrict investment in their
business concerns, thereby limiting the growth of their
firms (Barber and Odean 2001, Dohmen et al. 2011).
However, the differences in firm size may also be an
outcome of the differences in survival rate of male and
female-owned enterprises. If the survival rate of female-
owned firms differs from that of the male-owned firms,
we would expect the female-owned enterprises to be
more skewed towards smaller-sized firms. Though our
dataset does not permit us to explore these two questions,
it is, however, possible to analyze whether the differences
in firm size explain the gender gap in firm performance.
In our dataset too, about 97% of firms owned by women
entrepreneurs are micro enterprises as against 85% for
male-owned firms. We therefore include firm size as a
control variable in our specifications.9
Our result clearly suggests that there exists a significant
gap in performance between firms owned by males and
those owned by females. Table 2 shows that in terms of
size of the firms10 (irrespective of using output or employ-
ment), there exists a significant gender differential in per-
formance even after controlling for age, firm size (using
three dummy variables for micro, small, and medium
firms), caste of the owner (using three dummy variables
for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, other backward castes
(general as the base category), dummies for type of orga-
nization, and industry and state effects. The annual output
of an average female-owned firm is 32% points less than
the annual production of an averagemale-owned firm. The
gap is much larger for women as manager (51.9%) and
women as owner and manager (56.7%). Across all spec-
ifications, all measures of performance, and measures of
entrepreneurship, male entrepreneurs do perform better
than female entrepreneurs. Using the number of workers
as a proxy for firm size, we find an average female-owned
firm to be 13.8% points smaller than that of an average
male-owned firm. Our findings are robust to our alternate
measures of women entrepreneurship (women as manager
and women both as manager and owner) and the gaps are
found to be much larger for these alternate measures.11
Our results remain invariant when we consider
efficiency/productivity instead of firm size. We observe
that the TFP for the female-owned firms is significantly
smaller than their male counterparts. Same holds true
when we use labor productivity as an alternative—the
results remain unaltered with respect to the role of female:
as owner, as manager, or as both. Note all of our specifi-
cations include age and its square, size of the firms, and
industry and state effects. Therefore, age and size are not
the driving factors behind the findings that woman-led
firms performworse than those of their male counterparts.
Another explanation cited in the literature (Bardasi
et al. 2011) related to the underperformance of female
entrepreneurs is their predominance in low performing
and less productive industries. We proceed as follows:
we compute an index that measures the representation of
women-led businesses in each sector and then compare
the performance of firms in female-dominated sectors
with those that are male dominated. Figure 1 demon-
strates the representation of women businesses accord-
ing to two-digit industry classifications. We observe that
the ratio is greater than one in just three sectors, namely
wearing apparel, textiles, and tobacco products.
We proceed to examine the relative performance of
male- and female-owned businesses in female-dominated
and male-dominated sectors by estimating Eq. (1) as
stated above. Equation (1) helps us to differentiate be-
tween two implicit hypotheses of lower performance of
the industries and lower performance of women entrepre-
neurs within these industries. Table 3 provides an insight
into this explanation. We concentrate on two measures of
performance: size (proxied by output) and productivity
(proxied by TFP). The results reported in Table 3 confirm
that the partial explanation for the underperformance of
female entrepreneurs can be derived from the predomi-
nance of women enterprises in less efficient sectors.
Across all estimations, the estimates of coefficients of
Female and Female × Female Dominant Sector are9 Micro enterprises are firms where the investment in plant and ma-
chinery does not exceed 25 lakh rupees; small refers to enterprises
where the investment in plant and machinery is more than 25 lakh
rupees but does not exceed five crore rupees; and medium are those
enterprises where the investment in plant and machinery is more than
five crore rupees but does not exceed ten crore rupees.
10 For brevity, we do not report of the results without controls.
11 Following an anonymous reviewer’s suggestion and De and Nagraj
(2014), we have also estimated a model where log of real value of plant
and machinery has been used as size. The coefficient takes a value of −
0.411 (female as owner), − 0.622 (female as manager), and − 0.689
(female as both). All the coefficients are significant at 1% level.
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negative and significant. The estimated coefficient of
Female dominant sector yields a negative sign across
all model specifications but is significant only in two
specifications (columns 3 and 4). The statistically signif-
icant results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that firms that
operate in sectors that are female-dominated are relatively
smaller (− 47%) and less productive (− 21%) than those
firms that operate in male-dominated sectors. This per-
haps lends evidence to the fact that female entrepreneurs
tend to focus more on sectors that are dominated by firms
which are on average smaller and less productive. The
negative and significant coefficients of the interaction
term Female × Female Dominant Sector suggest that
the choice of sectors (female-dominated versus male-
dominated) does influence the gap between male and
female entrepreneurs in size and performance of firms.
Together, the negative and significant coefficients of
Female and Female × Female Dominant Sector
indicate that female-run firms operating in female
dominant sectors are significantly smaller and less
efficient than those that operating in male-dominated
sectors. Considering the results in Tables 2 and 3 togeth-
er, we observe that this skewed representation of women
in certain sectors does not seem to fully explain the
underperformance of firms owned by women entrepre-
neurs. This is clearly evident from the large and signif-
icant difference in the performance and size of male-
owned and female-owned firms, even after controlling
for the choice of the sector of operation.12
Our results fail to explain why female-owned firms
indeed would like to be based in sectors which are poorly
performing. An interesting policy question is whether
women entrepreneurs are entering sectors with smaller
and less efficient firms by Bchoice^ or by Bforce?^ If it is
by choice, what are the key factors that attract them
towards these sectors? If they are forced to work in these
sectors, what are the key elements that exclude them from
other sectors? Our dataset, however, does not permit us to
undertake an analytical exercise for searching answers to
these questions. However, our dataset allows us to explore
whether their decision to operate in these sectors is deter-
mined by credit availability. The investigation of this issue
assumes greater relevance in our present line of enquiry
12 Following the suggestions made by an anonymous referee, we
carried out a separate analysis for female-dominated sectors and male
dominated sectors. When we use log of output as the dependent
variable, the coefficient takes the value of − 0.517 (female as owner),
− 0.624 (female as manager), and − 0.631 (female as both) for female-
dominated sectors and − 0.086 (female as owner), − 0.317 (female as
manager), and − 0.391 (female as both) for male-dominated sectors. In
the case of TFP, the coefficient yields − 0.544 (female as owner), −
0.432 (female as manager), and − 0.440 (both owner and manager) for
female-dominated sectors and − 0.086 (female as owner), − 0.179
(female as manager), and − 0.244 (female as both) for male-
dominated sectors. All coefficient values are significant except for
the female as owner in the case of male-dominated sectors.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Basic metal
Chemicals
Electrical machinery
Food products
Furniture
Leather
Machinery
Medical precision and opticals
Metal products
Motor vehicles
Non-metallic minerals
Office and computing machinery
Other transport
Paper
Petroleum products
Publishing and printing
Radio and television
Rubber and plastics
Textiles
Tobacco
Wearing apparel
Wood products
Owner and Manager Manager Owner
Fig. 1 Female entrepreneurs’ representation by industry. Note:
We define the representation of women entrepreneurs as the ratio
of share of female entrepreneurs to total entrepreneurs in a partic-
ular industry to the share of female entrepreneurs to total
entrepreneurs in the entire MSME sector. If the value of this index
is greater than one in a particular sector, it denotes that the female
entrepreneurs are overrepresented in that sector
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since various studies acknowledge severe barriers for
women entrepreneurs in access to credit (Asiedu et al.
2013; Hansen and Rand 2014).
3.2 Constraints to growth of women-owned firms
To examine the gender discrimination in accessing credit,
we estimate a logit equation as given in Eq. (2). The
estimation results are reported in Table 4. In all the spec-
ifications, the coefficient associated with female as owner,
our main variable of interest, is negative and statistically
significant. According to the estimates, the odds of getting
a loan for female owners is about 10.2% lower than for
male owners, for all loans. The odds continue to be lower
if female is manager or both owner and manager; howev-
er, the effect is not statistically significant. Considering the
smaller proportion of firms that receive loans in the
MSME sector, this is a fairly large number, indicating
the presence of substantial gender difference in financial
constraints. The impact is lower for institutional loan: the
odds of getting an institutional loan for female owners is
about 6.4% lower than for male owners. The gender
differential is substantially higher for non-institutional
loan compared to institutional loan and this is particularly
interesting given that small firms depend more on non-
institutional loans rather than institutional loans. For non-
institutional loan, the coefficient associated with Female
(as owner, as manager and as both) is negative and statis-
tically significant. Turning to the location of the firm, the
coefficient is not significant. Exporting firms and firms
that are part of a cluster have higher odds of loan approval,
which implies that lenders consider it less risky to lend to
those firms that market their products abroad and that are
part of a larger network. Consistent with our prior expec-
tations, we also find that entrepreneurial ability and finan-
cial literacy do matter in eliciting a positive response from
the lender. Our proxies for ability and literacy (account
maintenance and possessing a quality certificate) have
yielded positive coefficients, showing that lenders’ satis-
faction on entrepreneurial abilities increases the likelihood
of loan approval.13 There is also a clear direction from our
results that the probability of obtaining a loan is
significantly higher among firms that show a better per-
formance in terms of profitability and productivity, since
the coefficients of all measures of firm performance are
positive and most of them are significant across all our
specifications. Age variable exerts an interesting pattern
revealing a U-shaped relationship. Following Haans et al.
(2016) and Lind andMehlum (2010), we test the presence
of a U-shaped relationship. In all our specifications, we
notice the presence of a U-shaped relationship with re-
spect to age and the turning point turns out to be around
39 years for all firms and those with institutional loans
whereas it hovers around 29 years in case of firms with
non-institutional loans.14 Furthermore, our results are also
robust to alternate measures of women entrepreneurship.
If we focus on the variable identifying the gender of the
manager rather than female participation in ownership, the
results again show evidence of gender-based discrimina-
tion in the credit market, once we condition for firms
characteristics. The same result holds even when we use
the variable capturing the dual role of women as owner
and manager. The results reported in Table 4 remains
qualitatively similar if we use output of 2 years back
instead of current and lagged output. Use of better
performance/productivity measures in terms of log of
profit and labor productivity also did not change our
results regarding the gender variable qualitatively.15
Does the reported result in Table 4 suffer from sample
selection bias? Earlier studies highlight that firms often
self-select not to apply for a loan (Cavalluzzo et al. 2002;
Bardasi et al. 2011). Self-selection for not applying for
loans may arise due to the absence of need for external
finance and some of the applicants may fear a rejection.
Therefore, it is essential to correct for the self-selection
problem in our empirical analysis. Our empirical strategy
to overcome the self-selection problem involves identify-
ing firms as constrained and unconstrained with credit
demand (Bigsten et al. 2003). We classify sample firms
as Bconstrained^ if they report a shortage of capital, while
those firms receiving loans and which did not report any
capital shortage were classified as Bunconstrained.^16 To
13 Following the suggestion made by an anonymous referee, we have
also estimated a model for institutional loan approval where we have
interacted female variable with account maintenance dummy. The inter-
action term enters with odds ratio of 1.083 (female as owner), 1.088
(female as manager), and 1.126 (female as both) indicating that female
maintaining an account experiences higher odds of loan approval. The
coefficients associated with other variables remain qualitatively the same.
14 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
15 Detailed results are available on request. We observe the partial
correlation coefficient between current output, 1-year lagged output,
and 2-year lagged output is 0.988 and 0.978 respectively.
16 In the survey, a question is being asked: whether shortage of funds is
an obstacle for satisfactory performance. We use this variable to define
demand for loan as a binary variable for our biprobit model. Specifi-
cally it takes a value of 1 either for enterprises that received credit from
formal or informal sources or those that reported that they were short of
finance capital, otherwise 0.
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address the selection issue, we employ a bivariate probit
model. We use lagged output growth as the exclusion
restriction for identification purpose assuming that it influ-
ences demand for credit but not the final outcome.17
Lagged output growth is defined as the logarithmic differ-
ence of output between 2004/2005 and 2005/2006. We
believe that lagged output growth would reduce the de-
mand for credit in the current year as it would help firms to
manage their operations with internal funds better. Results
of our bivariate probit regression estimations after
correcting for self-section are reported in Table 5. The
Wald test of independent equations rejects the null
hypothesis (H0: ρ = 0), validating our model
specification.18
The coefficient of our variable of interest Female is
negative and significant suggesting that the likelihood of
receiving a bank loan is higher amongmale entrepreneurs
as compared to female entrepreneurs.19 The estimated
marginal effects show that a female owner possesses a
1% lower probability of getting a loan, which indicates
they faced shortage of funds as an obstacle for satisfac-
tory performance compared to their male counterparts.
The results remain almost the same when we use female
acting as both owner and manager. Other controls have
maintained more or less the same sign and significance as
the results for our baseline econometric specification. Our
findings are thus essentially robust with regard to con-
cerns arising from self-selection, and we conclude that
there exists clear evidence to support the existence of
gender-based discrimination in the credit market. Further,
we carry out the same analysis with respect to institution-
al and non-institutional loans. The results regarding gen-
der discrimination in terms of obtaining a loan condition-
al on credit demand remains valid.20
3.3 Decomposition of the gender gap in access
to finance
Given the existence of gender gap in access to finance,
we next explain this gap using the modified version of
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique. The de-
composition technique is a kind of a matching where
two groups are matched on a one-to-one basis. This
decomposition technique helps in providing an answer
to the extent to which differences in observable group
characteristics can explain gender gap in access to cred-
it. The extent to which one may attribute gender gap in
credit access will depend on the choice of the reference
group. The standard practice is to use the relatively more
advantaged group as the reference (male-owned firms in
our case) and show discrimination against less
advantaged female-led firms. We decompose the gender
differences in the probability of obtaining loan, using
indicators of female involvement (ownership, manage-
ment, ownership and management). The results of the
decomposition (Table 6) show that female owners face
2% lower probability of getting a loan as compared to
male entrepreneurs. The decomposition output, the gap
in probability of getting a loan across the gender, is
divided into three parts. The first part (endowment)
reflects the mean increase in female’s success probabil-
ity if they had the same characteristics as male, whereas
the second part (coefficients) shows the change in fe-
male’s success probability when applying the men’s
coefficients to the female’s characteristics. The third part
is the interaction term that measures the simultaneous
effect of differences in endowments and coefficients.
For female manager (fourth column, Table 6), the prob-
ability of getting a loan is 3.3% lower than males and it
is mainly due to the endowment effects. We observe that
the probability of not getting a loan increases to 4%
when female acts as both owner and manager. Although
not reported, we also perform the same analysis for
institutional loans.21 For female, the probability of
17 Results remain invariant if we define output growth variable as the
growth in output comparing the output of past 2 years with the current
output. Unfortunately, the dataset does not provide any information on
the reasons for not seeking loan.
18 We have also tried different specifications for our bivariate probit
model: (a) including both current output and lagged output in the loan
equation and including real value of plant and machinery in the credit
demand equation and (b) including both current output and lagged
output in the loan equation, whereas including current output, lagged
output, and real value of plant and machinery in the credit demand
equation. In both cases, our findings remain qualitatively the same. In
case (a), real value of plant and machinery enters with a positive
significant coefficient in credit demand equation, whereas the sign
associated with lagged output in the loan equation is negative and
significant. The marginal effects show that a female owner possesses
a 1% lower probability of getting a loan for case a). In case of (b), sign
and significance of the coefficient associated with real value of plant
and machinery remains unchanged whereas the sign associated with
both current and lagged output in the loan equation is positive. In this
case, the sign of lagged output in the credit demand equation is positive
and significant whereas that associated with current output is negative
and significant. The marginal effects show that a female owner pos-
sesses a 0.8% lower probability of getting a loan for case (b).
19 We report the results for two specifications for all loans only:
women as owner and women as both: owner and manager.
20 Detailed results are available on request.
21 Results are available on request.
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getting an institutional loan is 1%, 2.9%, and 2.4%
lower than males for female owner, female owner
and manager, and female manager respectively,
and it is again mainly due to the endowment
effects.
4 Conclusion
The study presents new evidence on whether the gender
of the owner influences firm performance and credit
access from institutional sources. We employ unit-level
Table 5 Bivariate probit model and gender discrimination
Variables Women as owner Women as owner and manager
Coefficients (marginal effects) Coefficients (marginal effects)
Dependent variable: obtained loan
Female − 0.069 (− 0.010)** − 0.058 (− 0.008)*
Age of the firm − 0.020 (− 0.003)*** − 0.019 (− 0.003)***
Age square 0.0002*** 0.0002***
Log of current output 0.127 (0.018)*** 0.127 (0.018)***
Firm maintains an account 0.185 (0.028)*** 0.184 (0.028)***
Rural area − 0.148 (− 0.022)*** − 0.149 (− 0.021)***
Firm is part of a cluster 0.183 (0.030)* 0.181 (0.029)*
Firm has a quality certificate 0.080 (0.012)** 0.079 (0.012)**
Firm is exporting 0.094 (0.014)*** 0.093 (0.014)***
Technological know-how − 0.014 (− 0.002) − 0.014 (− 0.002)
Log of net worth of the firm 0.050 (0.007)*** 0.051 (0.007)***
Single owner 0.167 (0.022)*** 0.166 (0.022)***
Dependent variable: demand for loan
Female − 0.064** − 0.053*
Age of the firm − 0.019*** − 0.019***
Age square 0.0002*** 0.0002***
Log of current output 0.123*** 0.122***
Firm maintains an account 0.184*** 0.184***
Rural area − 0.146*** − 0.146***
Firm is part of a cluster 0.200* 0.198*
Firm has a quality certificate 0.087** 0.086**
Firm is exporting 0.095*** 0.094***
Technological know-how − 0.015 − 0.015***
Log of net worth of the firm 0.047*** 0.047***
Single owner 0.159*** 0.158***
Output growtht − 1 − 0.017*** − 0.017***
p value for (H0: ρ = 0) 0.000 0.000
No. of observations 1,149,247 1,149,247
Female stands for dummy for female as owner and female as both owner and manager. In all specifications, firm size (using
three dummy variables for micro, small, and medium firms), caste of the owner (using three dummy variables for scheduled
caste, scheduled tribe, other backward caste (general as base)), dummies controlling for type of organization, industry dummy
at two-digit SIC level, and state effects. Marginal effects reported in parenthesis are for probability of loan approval (taking
the value of one) conditional on credit demand (taking the value of one). Figures in parentheses are standard errors, corrected
for clustering at the industry level. Given square of age is a monotonic transformation of age, we report the marginal effect
for only age
***indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
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dataset for registered and unregistered enterprises,
drawn from the Fourth Survey round on the Indian
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises carried out for
the period 2006–2007. Our findings are broadly in line
with the previous studies on women entrepreneurship in
developed and emerging economies. In the first part of
the empirical analysis, we attempt to measure the gender
gaps in performance in terms of output, employment,
labor productivity, and total factor productivity. We
observe significant differences in the performance gap
between male- and female-owned enterprises even after
controlling for size, age, social background, and indus-
try and state differences. We also observe that there is a
preponderance of women enterprises in a few sectors
which are typically considered as feminine occupations
(see Marlow and Patton 2007; Ghani et al. 2017). Tak-
ing this into account, we test whether the performance
differential arises due to the predominance of women
enterprises in certain sectors. We find that female-run
firms operating in female dominant sectors are signifi-
cantly smaller and less efficient than those that operate
in male-dominated sectors, which suggests that a partial
explanation of the underperformance of female entre-
preneurs can be derived from this skewed representa-
tion. However, the large and significant differences in
the performance and size of male-owned and female-
owned firms, even after controlling for the choice of the
sector of operation, shows that the preponderance of
women entrepreneurs in certain sectors alone does not
fully explain the underperformance of firms owned by
women entrepreneurs.
As several studies have highlighted the severe im-
pediments that women-owned firms face in obtaining
credit, we investigate whether there are significant gen-
der discrimination against women entrepreneurs for for-
mal credit in the small-firm credit market. Unlike the
existing studies, our dataset provides an opportunity to
analyze the gender gap in credit access using various
measures of women involvement in the ownership and
management of the enterprises. Our econometric exer-
cise points out unambiguously that irrespective of the
extent of women’s involvement in the firms, women-led
businesses are less likely to obtain formal finance. We
find that male-owned firms have about a 10–12% higher
odds probability of obtaining a loan as compared to
women-owned firms. Various robustness tests that we
undertook support the existence of gender-based
discrimination in the credit market. The findings
are thus consistent with the fact that women-
owned firms are disadvantaged in the market for
small-business credit, which has been traditionally
attributed to discrimination.
Our empirical analysis indicates that addressing the
gender discrimination in the small-business credit mar-
ket could help, partly, in bridging the performance gap
between male- and female-owned firms. Therefore,
policymakers need to focus their efforts to offer more
credit and support for female-owned enterprises.
Table 6 Non-linear decomposition of gender discrimination in access to all loans
Women as owner Women as owner and manager Women as manager
Differential Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Prediction (male) 0.117 (0.003)*** 0.118 (0.0003)*** 0.118 (0.0003)***
Prediction (female) 0.099 (0.001)*** 0.078 (0.001)*** 0.085 (0.001)***
Difference 0.018 (0.001)*** 0.040 (0.001)*** 0.033 (0.001)***
Decomposition
Endowments 0.020 (0.001)*** 0.055 (0.002)*** 0.050 (0.001)***
Coefficients 0.013 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.001)***
Interaction − 0.015 (0.001)*** − 0.023 (0.001)*** − 0.022 (0.001)***
No. of observations 1,149,247 1,149,247 1,149,247
In all specifications, we include age and its square, log of output, dummy for firmmaintaining an account, rural area dummy, dummy for firm
be part of a cluster, dummy for firm having a quality certificate, dummy for whether firm is exporting, dummy technological know-how, log
of net worth of the firm, dummy for single owner, firm size (using three dummy variables for micro, small and medium firms), caste of the
owner (using three dummy variables for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, other backward caste (general as base)), dummies controlling for
type of organization, industry dummy at two-digit SIC level, and state effects. Figures in parentheses are standard errors, corrected for
clustering at the industry level
***indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level
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Another possible policy option is to develop credit
registries which can help the women entrepreneurs in
overcoming the information asymmetry in the credit
market. The evidence presented in the study opens up
interesting avenues for future research on women entre-
preneurship and a possible extension to other emerging
economies.
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